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"NEITHER PEACE NOR UNIFORMITY":'
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE
WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION
MICHAEL E. LIBONATI*
I. INTRODUCTION
This conference exemplifies the "Wisconsin Idea"-that scholars can
be of service to state decision makers.2
Framers of a Badger State Constitution for the twenty-first century
can draw upon several excellent monographs in the Wisconsin Blue
Book amply documenting the history and function of local government.'
Academics and practitioners in the fields of public policy and public
administration have produced Wisconsin-specific reports thoroughly
canvassing contemporary issues in state-local relations.'
Making institutional policy is a complex and difficult task requiring
interdisciplinary skills5 and sound political judgment.6  This Article,
1. State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 517, 137 N.W. 20, 31 (1912) (Timlin,
J., concurring).
* Laura H. Carnell Professor and Professor of Law, Beasley School of Law, Temple
University. A.B. 1964, Georgetown University; LL.B. 1967, Yale University; LL.M. 1969,
Yale University.
2. See generally Jack Stark, The Wisconsin Idea: The University's Service to the State, in
Wis. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN 1995-1996 BLUE BOOK 101
(1995).
3. See James R. Donoghue, The Local Government System of Wisconsin, in Wis.
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN 1968 BLUE BOOK 69-281; James
R. Donoghue, Local Government in Wisconsin, in Wis. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU,
STATE OF WISCONSIN 1979-1980 BLUE BOOK 96-310 (1979); Susan C. Paddock, The
Changing World of Wisconsin Local Government, in WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE
BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN 1997-1998 BLUE BOOK 100-171 (1997); M.G. Toepel, The
Community of Governments in Wisconsin, in WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY,
STATE OF WISCONSIN 1952 BLUE BOOK 75-172.
4. See generally WIS. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON STATE-LOCAL P'SHIPS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY, REPORT (2001); TIM SHEEHY, STATE OF WiS. TASK FORCE ON STATE & LOCAL
GOV'T, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2003); Don Dyke, Municipal and County
Government, in WIS. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, WISCONSIN LEGISLATOR BRIEFING BOOK
2005-2006 L-1 (2005).
5. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY
(2005).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
drawing on previous work,7 offers Wisconsin policy-makers a
perspective on the job of framing constitutional choices concerning
state-local relations drawn from a comparative analysis of other state
constitutions.
The Article is divided into three parts. First, a discussion of the
types of local government and an analysis of the components of local
government autonomy is presented. Second, a broad overview of the
constitutional texts and judicial decisions that have shaped current
Wisconsin law is set forth. Third, a survey of alternative models of
state-local relations found in other state constitutions is reviewed.
II. WISCONSIN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: DEFINITION AND ANALYSIS
The U.S. Census Bureau's 2002 Census of Governments provides a
straightforward description of the types of Wisconsin local government.
Wisconsin has three types of general purpose government:
1. county governments (72);
2. municipal governments including cities and villages (585); and
3. town governments (1265). 8
And Wisconsin has two types of special purpose government:
1. public school systems (446); and
2. special district governments (684).'
The Wisconsin Constitution mentions counties, cities, villages,
towns, and district schools, but not special districts. But it does not
6. ELMER GERTZ & JOSEPH P. PISCIOTrE, CHARTER FOR A NEW AGE 248-60 (1980)
(discussing significance of the home rule provision in assuring political support for voter
ratification of the Illinois Constitution); JOHN P. WHEELER, JR. & MELISSA KINSEY,
MAGNIFICENT FAILURE-THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967-1968,
at 203 (1970) (attributing failure of voters to ratify proposed constitution to provision
abolishing county row offices).
7. See generally U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY (1993); Michael E. Libonati, Local Government, in 3
STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 109 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F.
Williams eds., 2006).
8. 1 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2002 CENSUS OF
GOVERNMENTS NO. 2, INDIVIDUAL STATE DESCRIPTIONS 305 (2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/govs/www/cog2002.html.
9. Id. at 304-07.
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define these terms. The Wisconsin legislature has created a complex
body of law that sorts counties, four classes of cities, and four classes of
school districts by population." But the legislature's power to classify is
qualified by three partially overlapping provisions dealing with special
and private laws" and by three provisions concerned with uniformity. 2
The legislature's capacity to make institutional policy is further curbed
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's occasional commitment to text-
focused originalism. For example, the legislature defined the term
"village" by criteria based on population and density. The court,
however, held that the term "village" has a meaning historically fixed as
of the time of the constitution's adoption. 13 The petition to incorporate
the proposed village was dismissed since it did not allege facts sufficient
to show that the proposed village was "a political, sociological, and
geographic unit."" Similarly, statutory law cannot limit a county
sheriff's historically grounded powers of "maintaining law and order"
and "preserving the peace."15 As the court explained in a decision
striking down a statute establishing a state Department of Education
that impinged on the powers of the state Superintendent of Public
Instruction:
In interpreting a constitutional provision, the court turns
to three sources in determining the provision's meaning:
the plain meaning of the words in the context used; the
constitutional debates and the practices in existence at
the time of the writing of the constitution; and the
earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature
as manifested in the first law passed following adoption. 6
Twenty-first century framers need a way to talk about state-local
relations that reflects the collective understanding of that issue in state
constitution-making. To that end, the terms "initiative" and
10. Paddock, supra note 3, at 110-11, 119, 135.
11. WIS. CONST. art. IV, §§ 18, 31, 32.
12. Id. arts. IV, § 23 (towns), XI, § 3(1) (home rule cities and villages), X, § 3 (school
districts).
13. In re Incorporation of Oconomowoc Lake v. Town of Summit, 270 Wis. 530, 535-36,
72 N.W.2d 544, 544-47 (1955).
14. Id. at 535-38, 72 N.W.2d at 547-48.
15. Heitkemper v. Wirsing, 194 Wis. 2d 182, 191, 533 N.W.2d 770, 774 (1995) (quoting
Manitowoc County v. Local 986B, 168 Wis. 2d 819, 830, 484 N.W.2d 534 (1992)).
16. Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123, 127 (1996) (citations
omitted).
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"immunity" are useful. Initiative refers to state constitutional provisions
that empower local governments. 17  Immunity refers to state
constitutional provisions that limit the legislature's power over local
governments.18 Local government discretionary authority is made up of
degrees of initiative and immunity given by the state constitution.'9
Analysis of the policy issues confronting state constitution-makers is
further sharpened by focusing on the degree of local discretionary
authority in four areas:
1. structure-determining their form of government and internal
organization;
2. function-choosing the functions they perform;
3. fiscal-raising revenue, borrowing, and spending; and
4. personnel-fixing the numbers, types, and employment
conditions of their employees.20
Each of these terms, initiative, immunity, structure, function, fiscal,
and personnel aim at easing the twenty-first century framers' job of
"establishing good government from reflection and choice."'"
III. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION: A
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The Wisconsin State Constitution, like other state constitutions,2 is a
document limiting the otherwise plenary powers of the legislative
branch. 3  The plenary power principle impacts on the interpretive
practice of the Wisconsin judiciary. Each validly enacted statute
benefits from a presumption of constitutionality and an interlinked
judicial policy of deference to the legislature's judgment. 2  The
17. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 7,
at 1.
18. See id.
19. City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 640 So. 2d 237, 242 (La. 1994).
20. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 7, at
1.
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
22. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 7-9 (1998). But see
Richard B. Sanders & Barbara Mahoney, Restoration of Limited State Constitutional
Government: A Dissenter's View, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 269, 269-70 (2003).
23. Libertarian Party of Wis. v. State, 199 Wis. 2d 790, 801, 546 N.W.2d 424, 430 (1996).
24. City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 144 Wis. 2d 896, 911-14, 426
N.W.2d 591, 598-600 (1998) (discussing whether legislation empowering a special district
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following brief summary of the constitutional fate of local government
in Wisconsin calls attention to the role played by the judiciary in shaping
institutional policy.
A. From the Northwest Ordinance to Statehood (1787-1847)
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 fixed responsibility for regulating
and defining the powers of civil officers in each county or township upon
the territorial legislature.' The 1836 statute establishing the Wisconsin
Territorial Government mandated the election of township and county
officers but specified appointment of "judicial officers, justices of the
peace, sheriffs, and clerks of court. 2 6 The 1846 Wisconsin Enabling Act
left all governance issues to the framers of the state constitution with
one fiscal and functional exception. One section of public land in every
township was set aside and the proceeds from its sale were earmarked
for the use of schools. 27
B. Local Government in the 1848 Wisconsin Constitution
Constitutional provisions pertinent to local government in Wisconsin
are not organized by topic. The constitution does not have the general
local government article found in modern state constitutions.28 It does
not even have the entity-specific article found in the contemporary state
Constitutions of Ohio and Michigan. 9 Instead, relevant constitutional
provisions must be pieced together from article IV (Legislative), article
VIII (Finance), article IX (State Property), article X (Public Education),
article XI (Corporations), and article XIII (Miscellaneous).
State framers, then and now, face two hard institutional policy
issues.' The first issue is how to allocate decision making power at the
state level. The 1848 framers adopted the usual separation of powers
model creating executive, legislative, and judicial branches of state
violates WIS. CONST. art. IV, §§ 18, 31, 32); Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 73-
74, 267 N.W. 25, 31-32 (1936) (discussing deference due to legislature's determination of what
is a matter of state-wide concern, WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1)).
25. Northwest Ordinance § 7, Act of Congress, July 13, 1787, U.S. Rev. Stat. 13 (2d ed.
1878).
26. Wisconsin Territory § 7, Act of Congress, April 20, 1836, 5 Stat. 10.
27. Enabling Act § 7 (1), Act of Congress, August 6, 1846, 9 Stat. 56.
28. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. IX.
29. MICH. CONST. arts. X (counties), XI (townships) (1850); OHIO CONST. art. X
(county and township organization) (1851).
30. Arthur Maass, Division of Powers: An Areal Analysis, in AREA AND POWER 10, 14-
18 (Arthur Maass ed., 1959) (distinguishing between capital and areal division of power).
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government. The next issue is deciding what role, if any, the three
branches ought to play in framing local government. The 1848 framers
put most of the burden on the state legislature. But the legislature's
power was both limited and qualified, as the subsequent discussion
points out.
The legislature has the "duty" and is "empowered[] to provide for
the organization of cities and incorporated villages."3' But the
legislature is admonished "to restrict their power of taxation,
assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their
credit, so as to prevent abuses in assessments and taxation, and in
contracting debts by such municipal corporations., 32  This provision
more nearly reflects the experience of New York State,3 3 from whose
constitution the provision was taken, than that of frontier Wisconsin.
The provision anticipates the story of municipal fiscal corruption but
leaves preventive measures to the legislature's discretion.
The legislature is also expressly authorized to confer, in its
discretion, upon county boards of supervisors "such powers of a local,
legislative and administrative character as they shall from time to time
prescribe. 3 4 This provision, again taken from New York,3' seems
puzzling since it neither empowers counties nor shields them from state
legislative action. It seems drafted to forestall an objection based on the
non-delegation doctrine.3 6  "The constitutional basis for the non-
delegation doctrine is the clause vesting the legislative power in the state
legislature., 37 That constitutional assignment of legislative power to the
legislature is interpreted by the judiciary to bar the legislature from
delegating legislative powers to others, including local governments.
This judge-made rule has played a big role in two important
Wisconsin cases. A statute giving a county board a voice on dam
construction was struck down on the grounds that it unconstitutionally
delegated power over a matter of statewide concern. 38 And a statute
granting broad powers of local self-government to the City of
31. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (amended 1912).
32. Id.
33. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. III, § 17.
34. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
35. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. III, § 17.
36. The non-delegation doctrine is discussed in Libonati, supra note 7, at 39.
37. Id.
38. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952).
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Milwaukee was struck down on the same grounds.39 The latter case led
to a reform of the state constitution when the Home Rule Amendment
was adopted.
The 1848 constitution contains a process constraint on the
legislature. Local laws are not valid unless they embrace one subject,
and that subject must be signposted in the title.' This provision, also
taken from the 1846 New York Constitution,41 is linked in the current
constitution to provisions concerning local laws that were adopted in
1872 and will be discussed infra.
The principle of uniformity is woven through various provisions of
the 1848 constitution as a limitation on legislative power. Thus, the
legislature's power to choose the structure of town and county
government is hedged by the requirement that the system "shall be as
nearly uniform as practicable. 42 And district schools "shall be as nearly
uniform as practicable., 43 These provisions are good examples of the
inclusion of "enigmatic"" language in the Wisconsin Constitution.
Enigmatic provisions pose interpretive problems and invite litigation.
And, predictably, litigation has occurred.45  In 1972, a piecemeal
amendment deleted the requirement that "county government be
uniform., 46 And the school district uniformity requirement did not bar
the legislature from enacting a successful program of school district
consolidation.4 1 But twenty-first century framers should bear in mind
that enigmatic language has the two-fold effect of generating significant
litigation-related transaction costs that act as a barrier to legislative
reform and of giving courts the last word on the validity of structural
reform.
The 1848 constitution addresses the issue of citizen choice in
structural policy-making. Citizen choice is expanded by filling some
county offices (sheriff, coroner, register of deeds, and district attorney)
39. State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488,489, 494, 497, 137 N.W. 20,21, 23, 24
(1912).
40. WIS. CONsT. art. IV, § 18.
41. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. III, § 16.
42. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 23 (amended 1962).
43. Id. art. X, § 3.
44. See generally Jack Stark, Enigmatic Grants of Law-Making Rights and
Responsibilities in the Wisconsin Constitution, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 961 (1998).
45. JACK STARK, THE WISCONSIN STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 99-
101 (1997) (Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States, No. 28, G. Alan
Tarr series ed., 1997) (discussing case law).
46. Id. at 99.
47. Id. at 187.
2007]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
by election rather than by appointment.48 And the local electorate, not
the legislature, chooses whether small county boundaries shall be
divided or detached4 9 and whether the location of the county seat shall
be changed.'
The 1848 constitution both authorizes the decentralization of the
education function by requiring the legislature to establish district
schools and provides for a degree of centralized state control by creating
the elected state Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction.5 The
policy of joint state and local responsibility for the provision of free
educational services is reinforced by a provision requiring city and town
tax efforts in support of public education. 2 Default in this obligation
triggered a withholding of state school fund appropriations.53
The uniformity theme re-emerges in the arena of fiscal policy. The
Finance Article mandates a rule of tax uniformity.' The voluminously
litigated and much-amended Tax Uniformity Clause screens legislation
aiming at fiscal reform through a less-than-transparent, judge-made, six-
part test" that is viewed by an expert on the Wisconsin Constitution as
48. WIS. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
49. Id. art. XIII, § 7.
50. Id. art. XIII, § 8.
51. Id. art. X, §§ 1, 3.
52. Id. art. X, § 4.
53. Id. art. X, § 5.
54. Id. art. VIII, § 1.
55. The Wisconsin Supreme Court described the six-part test in Gottlieb v. City of
Milwaukee:
1. For direct taxation of property, under the uniformity rule there can be
but one constitutional class.
2. All within that class must be taxed on a basis of equality so far as
practicable and all property taxed must bear its burden equally on an ad
valorem basis.
3. All property not included in that class must be absolutely exempt from
property taxation.
4. Privilege taxes are not direct taxes on property and are not subject to
the uniformity rule.
5. While there can be no classification of property for different rules or
rates of property taxation, the legislature can classify as between property
that is to be taxed and that which is to be wholly exempt, and the test of
such classification is reasonableness.
6. There can be variations in the mechanics of property assessment or tax
imposition so long as the resulting taxation shall be borne with as nearly
as practicable equality on an ad valorem basis with other taxable property.
33 Wis. 2d 408, 424, 147 N.W.2d 633, 641-42 (1967).
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incomplete, contradicted by other cases, and inconsistently applied.56
Twenty-first century framers should reexamine whether the Tax
Uniformity Clause should continue to serve as "the foundation of the
state's tax policy."57
C. Immunity But Not Initiative: 1872 Amendments Curbing "Special"
Laws Affecting Local Governments
In 1871, a provision dealing with "special" legislation 8 was added to
the Wisconsin Constitution's existing subject-title requirement for
"local" bills.59 The rationale for its adoption in Wisconsin was well-
expressed by Chief Justice Ryan in an 1877 opinion:
And in all instances relating to things publici juris, they
[the legislature] broke the uniformity and harmony of
law so essential to good government; substituting special
for general rules, and rendering a large body of the
municipal law fragmentary in character, and different by
locality. After long endurance of such excesses of
legislation, the amendment of 1871 was adopted; in
order, so far as it went, to confine legislation to its
legitimate objects, to substitute general for special
enactments, and to restore order and uniformity to
municipal law. 60
But the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the amendment did not
strip the legislature of its power to classify, 61 and the court often defers
to the legislature's judgment that population size is a proper basis for
classification. 6 And so, for example, there are four classes of cities in
Wisconsin defined by population size whose structure and function are
partly fixed by the city's class.63
56. STARK, supra note 45, at 159.
57. Id. at 155.
58. WIS. CONST. art. IV, §§ 31-32.
59. Id. art. IV, § 18.
60. Kimball v. Town of Rosendale, 42 Wis. 407, 415 (1877).
61. Johnson v. City of Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, 388-40, 60 N.W. 270, 271 (1894).
62. State ex rel. Busacker v. Groth, 132 Wis. 283, 305-06, 112 N.W. 431, 437-39 (1907);
State ex rel. Risch v. Bd. of Tr. of Policemen's Pension Fund, 121 Wis. 44, 51-54, 98 N.W. 954,
956-58 (1904).
63. Stephen E. C. Hintz, Wisconsin, in DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN B.
HILL, JR., HOME RULE IN AMERICA 453, 454 (2001).
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In 1988, the Wisconsin Supreme Court attempted to clear up the
unsettled state of the law. Several municipalities disputed the validity of
a statute giving fiscal powers impacting on their capital budgets to a
special purpose district classified by population.64 The court majority
described the clashing arguments shaping constitutional discourse about
the meaning of the provisions governing local or special laws. In
particular, the court observed that:
Those cases in which the challenge is brought under sec.
31 invariably have followed the same patterns. A certain
legislative provision is challenged as being one of the
prohibited areas of legislation enumerated in sec. 31.
The proponents of the legislation rely on sec. 32,
claiming that the challenged legislation is a general law
which is uniform in application throughout the state. 65
The court majority sought to limit the century-old debate by linking
classification case law developed under sections 31 and 32 to subject-
title provision analysis by way of a "sophisticated multirule test to
determine whether legislation which is general on its face is
impermissibly local or private." 6 The challenged statute did not pass
subject-title muster under the six-part test 67 applied by the court.68 The
dissent criticized the majority both for its failure to require the
challenger to prove the law's unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable
doubt and to defer to the legislature's judgment concerning the
soundness and germaneness of the classification. 69
The dissent raised a significant issue for twenty-first century
framers-an issue that caused Virginia local governments to oppose the
insertion of a provision banning local or special laws in the Virginia
Constitution." In Virginia, the framers believed that the General
Assembly's authority to devolve powers on local government by special
act was "an essential means for ensuring flexibility and adoptability."7
64. City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 144 Wis. 2d 896, 898, 426
N.W.2d 591, 593 (1988).
65. Id. at 906, 426 N.W.2d at 596.
66. Id. at 914, 426 N.W.2d at 600.
67. Id. at 907-08, 426 N.W.2d at 597.
68. Id. at 916-18, 426 N.W.2d at 600-02.
69. Id. at 928-29, 426 N.W.2d at 605-06 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
70. COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 228-
29 (1969).
71. Id.
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In Wisconsin, however, that debate may be short-circuited by a 1993
amendment to section 32 stating that "[s]ubject to reasonable
classification, such laws shall be uniform in their operation throughout
the state. 7'  This amendment underscores the legislature's power to
classify while continuing to subject its work product to judicial review
for the reasonableness of the classifications adopted. In any event, the
three existing provisions shield Wisconsin local government from some
state statutes but do not give them additional authority to make policy.
D. Prelude to the Home Rule Amendment
The most important change in Wisconsin policy toward local
government between 1871 and the 1924 Home Rule Amendment came
in 1874. The constitution was amended to entrench precise rules of
fiscal policy by specifying debt limits, providing for the collection of
taxes to pay off the debt, and requiring repayment of the borrowed
principal within twenty years.73 This provision applied to every county,
city, town, village, school district, or other municipal corporation.74
But the development of three doctrines limiting legislative choice
over a range of policy issues, including policies concerning local
governments, was animated by the nineteenth century Wisconsin
judiciary. These doctrines, at best, lightly tethered to the text and
legislative history of the 1848 constitution are the following: the public
trust doctrine, 75 the public purpose doctrine, 76 and the non-delegation
doctrine.' Each of these doctrines, as the subsequent discussion points
out, continues to have an effect upon current state-local relations.
Whether and to what extent these doctrines ought to be curbed,
qualified, or adjusted is an issue for twenty-first century framers. But no
change in state constitutional policy can be effected without careful
consideration of the impact of these doctrines on local autonomy.
The "public trust" doctrine bars the legislature from pursuing a
policy of decentralized decision making over the domain subject to the
public trust. Pertinent cases involving local government have to do with
local legislative jurisdiction over navigable waters. The public trust over
72. WiS. CONST. art. IV, § 32.
73. The original text of the amendment to Wisconsin Constitution article XI, section 3, is
reprinted in 7 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 4103
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed. 1909).
74. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
75. See STARK, supra note 45, at 176-80.
76. See id. at 219-24.
77. See id. at 82-83.
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navigable waters is viewed by the courts as mandating state centralized
control over the location of dams, 78 over local government public works
projects,79 and over licensing of boats. 80 The doctrine applies with equal
force to home rule units because the matter in question is of state wide
concern. 8' Twenty-first century framers will most likely deal with these
state-local relations questions as part of a larger deliberation and debate
about the contents of a revised and modernized article on the subject of
the environment and natural resources.82
The public purpose doctrine sprang to life in Wisconsin in the
context of challenges to enactments authorizing local governments to
build public works83 and to raise money by taxation to pay bounties to
Civil War enlistees.' Although these enactments were sustained, the
doctrine has been an obstacle to legislation impacting on
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. For example, a statute
authorizing counties and municipalities to contract with one another and
with local landowners to perform construction and repair work on
private roads flunked the amorphous public purpose test.8" More
notably, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Buse v. Smith86 immunized
school districts from a fiscal mandate requiring wealthier school districts
to share their tax revenues with poorer districts. The court ruled not
only that a "tax must be for a public-not a private-purpose" but also
that "[t]he purpose of the tax must be one which pertains to the public
purpose of the [taxing] district within which the tax is to be levied and
raised. 8 7 This decision, with its clear localist tilt, will impact upon the
framing of the Education Article' of the twenty-first century Wisconsin
Constitution. And, because the decision on its face would bar any
legislative policy commanding own-source revenue-sharing, Buse v.
78. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952).
79. Vill. of Menomonee Falls v. Dep't of Natural Res., 140 Wis. 2d 579, 603--04, 412
N.W.2d 505, 515-16 (Ct. App. 1987).
80. City of Madison v. Tolzmann, 7 Wis. 2d 570, 575-76, 97 N.W.2d 513, 517 (1959).
81. Id.
82. See generally Barton H. Thompson Jr., The Environment and Natural Resources, in 3
STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 7, at 307-39; Jason J.
Czarnezki, Environmentalism and the Wisconsin Constitution, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 465 (2007).
83. Soens v. City of Racine, 10 Wis. 214 (1860).
84. Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 658 (1865).
85. Heimerl v. Ozaukee County, 256 Wis. 151, 160-61, 40 N.W.2d 564, 568-69 (1949).
86. 74 Wis. 2d 550,247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).
87. Id. at 590, 247 N.W.2d at 160.
88. See generally Paul L. Tractenberg, Education, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 7, at 241.
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Smith must be taken into account in any revision of constitutional
provisions pertinent to state and local finance.' The interdependent
nature of these policy issues is put in bold relief in the long title of a
recent book by William Fischel-The Homevoter Hypothesis: How
Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance,
and Land- Use Policies.90
The non-delegation doctrine is another nineteenth century barrier
that obstructs legislative delegation of authority to local government. 9'
The doctrine has led twentieth century Wisconsin courts down the path
of narrow construction of the language in the 1848 constitution expressly
authorizing the legislature to give counties "powers of a local, legislative
and administrative character." 92  And so, a local option statute
empowering counties to declare an ordinance violation to be a crime
and to provide for imprisonment as a punishment "is void as an attempt
to confer sovereignty upon the counties." 93 In a sweeping ruling five
years later, the court held that the legislature is barred from devolving
matters of "paramount [state] interest" on counties, such as questions
concerning dam construction on a navigable waterway. 9, On the fiscal
front, a law granting counties the power to grant tax exemptions is
invalid because that power is "the exclusive prerogative of the
legislature." 95
The most influential discussion of the linkage between the non-
delegation doctrine and legislative sovereignty is found in the majority
and concurring opinions in the leading case State ex rel. Mueller v.
Thompson.96
The Home Rule Act of 1911 granted cities both broad authority to
change their charters and "all powers in relation to the form of its
government, and to the conduct of its municipal affairs not in
contravention of or withheld by the constitution or laws, operative
89. See generally Richard Briffault, State and Local Finance, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 7, at 211.
90. See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001).
91. Libonati, supra note 7, at 39. The basis for the doctrine is discussed in the text supra
notes 36-38.
92. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
93. State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, 251 Wis. 79, 85, 28 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1947).
94. Muench v. Publ. Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 515 f-g, 55 N.W.2d 40,43 (1952).
95. Univ. of Wis. La Crosse Found., Inc. v. Town of Washington, 182 Wis. 2d 490, 497,
513 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Ct. App. 1994).
96. 149 Wis. 488, 498, 137 N.W. 20, 24 (1912).
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generally throughout the state."' 7 The challenged charter amendment
enacted pursuant to this statutory grant put socialist-governed
Milwaukee in the business of manufacturing and selling ice to its
citizens. 98
The opinion of the court by Justice Marshall teaches two lessons to
twenty-first century Wisconsin framers. First, any express grant of
power to the legislature to make institutional policy is likely to be
interpreted as an implied restraint. Thus, the legislature's 1848 duty and
power "to provide for the organization of cities" 99 reserved to the
legislature an "exclusive authority . . . of granting, amending, and
repealing municipal charters" that cannot be devolved upon
Milwaukee's citizens."°  Second, the non-delegation doctrine is a
principle that normally cannot be overridden without an express
constitutional amendment."'
However, it is the concurring opinion by Justice Timlin, not that of
the majority, which most strongly affected the fate of the project of local
self-government in Wisconsin. In that opinion, Justice Timlin reviewed
the efforts of other states to entrench an areal division of powers-
affording home rule entities initiative as to "municipal" matters or
affairs and promising immunity from legislative interference in
"municipal" matters or affairs."° He predicted that any constitutional
reform using the term "municipal" would lead either to continuous
judicial interference" or to continued legislative interference.'
Judicial interference develops "because of the constantly recurring
necessity for construction to determine what subjects are within and
what without the local power."' ' Any attempt to confer immunity on
home rule units further encourages judicial interference because "every
section of the charter and every ordinance must in time come before the
courts in order to ascertain whether it is a municipal affair only, and so
97. Id. at 490, 494, 137 N.W. at 22, 24.
98. Id. at 499, 137 N.W. at 25 (Timlin, J., concurring).
99. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
100. Mueller, 149 Wis. 488, 493, 137 N.W. 20, 23.
101. Id. at 497-98, 137 N.W. at 24.
102. Id. at 499, 504-515, 137 N.W. at 25, 26-30 (Timlin, J., concurring) (discussing home
rule provisions in Oregon, California, Missouri, Washington, Minnesota, and Michigan
constitutions).
103. Id. at 510, 515,517-18, 137 N.W. at 26, 28,31.
104. Id. at 517, 137 N.W. at 31.
105. Id. at 510, 137 N.W. at 29.
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whether subject to repeal or amendment by the state legislature."' 6 But
any constitutional grant of "municipal" powers that does not curb the
legislature leaves intact the legislature's sovereign authority to define
and redefine what matters are exclusively for the state or for the
municipality "as it deems wisest or most expedient." 0 7 And so, the
language of a proposed home rule constitutional amendment then
pending in the legislature could deliver neither the peace nor the
uniformity sought by its proponents."18
E. The Home Rule Amendment: Interpretation and Implementation
No Wisconsin framer should ignore the role that educating the state
judiciary plays in shaping institutional policy. The framers of the 1924
Home Rule Amendment apparently provided little by way of formal
legislative history to guide Wisconsin courts in their interpretive task. In
the leading case, Van Gilder v. City of Madison, Chief Justice
Rosenberry made use of a grab bag of sources in order to make sense of
the enacted text. These sources included Justice Timlin's 1912
concurrence, a 1916 treatise on municipal home rule, the 1918 legislative
history of a proposed home rule amendment in Massachusetts, and the
1929 concurring opinions of Justices Cardozo and Pound in a leading
New York decision.l°9
The Van Gilder case involved a conflict between a home rule city
seeking to retrench pay levels of police officers and a statutorily created
board of police and fire commissioners. A 1935 provision, although
applicable only to cities of the second through fifth classes, expressly
provided that it was enacted "for the purpose of providing a uniform
regulation of police and fire departments." "10 The statute gave the final
say on salary decreases to the board. Madison passed a charter
ordinance grounded on the constitutional grant of the powers to
determine its "local affairs and government.""' The board contended
that the home rule power is subject to "enactment of statewide concern
as with uniformity shall affect every city or every village."1 2 The court
resolved the matter in favor of the special district board finding that the
106. Id. at 517-18, 137 N.W. at 31-32.
107. Id. at 516, 137 N.W. at 31.
108. Id. at 517, 137 N.W. at 31.
109. Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 64-66, 81-83, 267 N.W. 25, 27-28, 34-35
(1936).
110. Id. at 74,267 N.W. at 31.
111. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3(1).
112. Id.
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law enforcement function is a matter of statewide concern." 3 Hence, the
home rule city's attempt to make fiscal policy by cutting police
personnel salaries did not succeed.
The Van Gilder case contains important caveats for twenty-first
century framers.
First, reinforcing Justice Timlin's warnings, the court observed that
phrases like "local affairs" and "statewide concern" are "practically
indefinable."'"4  And enigmatic phrases breed uncertainty across the
board-for citizens and interest groups seeking or opposing municipal
legislation, for municipal officials wondering whether they are free to
respond to those demands, for attorneys advising municipal officials, for
the attorney general issuing advisory opinions, as well as for the courts.
Second, entrenching a strong split between "local affairs" and
"statewide concern" did not reflect "the fact that the functions of state
and local governments necessarily overlap"'' 5 seventy years ago, nor
does it match today's realities.
Third, the home-rule amendment imposes the "heavy burden of
developing the lines of this big problem of policy upon the judicial
branch of the government."" 6 Accordingly, the Van Gilder court stated
the rationale for a strong principle of judicial deference to the
legislature's judgment:
In the first instance the determination of what is a "local
affair" and what is a "matter of state-wide concern"
would seem to be for the Legislature for the reason that
such a determination must involve large considerations
of public policy. Even though the determination made
by it should be held not to be absolutely controlling,
nevertheless it is entitled to great weight because matters
of public policy are primarily for the Legislature."
This view shaped Wisconsin case law. For example, the principle of
judicial deference was invoked in the Brelsford case challenging a
statute that inverted the Van Gilder court's holding that police
113. Van Gilder, 222 Wis. at 83-84, 267 N.W. at 35.
114. Id. at 73, 267 N.W. at 31.
115. Id. at 64,267 N.W. at 27.
116. Id. at 73, 267 N.W. at 31.
117. Id. at 73-74, 267 N.W. at 31.
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regulation is primarily a matter of state-wide concern." 8 That statute
expressly declared that police pension benefits in cities of the first-class
''are matters of local affairs and government and shall not be construed
as an enactment of state wide concern."" 9  The court, in upholding
Milwaukee's charter ordinance, reminded the puzzled reader that Van
Gilder is still good law.120 Van Gilder deferred to the legislature's
express judgment that, in cities of the second through fourth classes,
matters involving police personnel are of state wide concern. Likewise
the Brelsford court deferred to the legislature's express judgment that
some police personnel matters are predominantly a local affair in cities
of the first class (Milwaukee). The Wisconsin Supreme Court's
principle of deference to the legislature avoids the problems foreseen by
Justice Timlin and by Chief Justice Rosenberry as to judicial
interference in big policy questions. But the court's approach effectively
deprives home rule units of whatever shield against legislative
interference the 1924 amendment seemed to promise.12
The deference principle's most far-reaching effects on the functional
powers of home rule units are found in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
preemption case law. To make a long story short, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court currently applies a four-part test to determine whether a
municipal enactment is trumped by a state statute:
A municipal ordinance is preempted if (1) the legislature
has expressly withdrawn the power of municipalities to
act; (2) it logically conflicts with state legislation; (3) it
defeats the purpose of state legislation; or (4) it violates
the spirit of state legislation. Should any one of these
tests be met, the municipal ordinance is void. 122
The first two criteria are unavoidable, given that the deference
principle makes Wisconsin courts quite unreceptive to claims that the
statute expressly limiting municipal initiative trenches on a
constitutionally immunized "local affair." A more robust reading of
118. State ex rel. Brelsford v. Ret. Bd. of Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 41 Wis.
2d 77, 82-83, 163 N.W.2d 153, 155 (1968).
119. Act of July 19, 1951, ch. 705, § 3, 1951 Wis. Sess. Laws 523, 523-24.
120. Brelsford, 41 Wis. 2d at 86, 163 N.W.2d at 157.
121. Van Gilder, 222 Wis. at 80-81, 267 N.W. at 34-35.
122. DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak Creek, 200 Wis. 2d 642, 651-52, 547 N.W.2d
770, 773 (1996) (citations omitted); see also Anchor Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Equal
Opportunities Comm'n, 120 Wis. 2d 391, 397, 355 N.W.2d 234, 237 (1984) (leading case).
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"local affair" immunity would make every preemption question an issue
of constitutional dimension. And when the legislature expressly
declares its purpose, as it did in Van Gilder, to compel uniformity, the
judiciary is bound to defer. The danger of judicial interference masked
as legislative deference is most acute when the legislature has not
addressed the issue either expressly or in an unambiguous purpose
clause. A broad implied preemption doctrine not firmly tied to choices
made by the legislature in the statutory text 23 leaves less room for
governance by elected local government officials and more room for
governance by unelected civil servants at the state capitol. The
preemption issue ought to be addressed by twenty-first century framers
in view of the emergence and proliferation of specialized state
administrative agencies with broad rule-making authority.
If, as Justice Timlin observed in 1912, home rule is not a policy
"worth considering without the power of taxation on the part of the city
for city purposes, ' 124 then the Home Rule Amendment, as interpreted,
needs rethinking by contemporary framers. For Wisconsin courts
uniformly deny that the home rule power over "local affairs" includes
any grant of taxing authority.'25 These cases pursue a policy, as do the
preemption cases, of reading "local affairs" as language limiting rather
than granting powers to home rule units.
This historic overview of the constitutional face of state-local
relations in Wisconsin shows that the current document lacks focus,
invites disjointed interpretation by the legislature and the courts by
using enigmatic phrases, and embraces the plural values of uniformity
and diversity without providing a standard by which to measure the
trade-offs between these competing values.
The question of the day, whether the Wisconsin Constitution is
obsolete, cannot be answered by looking at the current document in
isolation from the models of state-local relations in other states. The
final section sketches the choices that other state framers have made in
light of the following issues posed by the U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations:
123. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 366-68 (2d ed. 2005)
(discussing policy issues underlying federal preemption doctrine).
124. State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 516, 123 N.W. 20, 31 (1912)
(Timlin, J., concurring).
125. City of Plymouth v. Eisner, 28 Wis. 2d 102, 107, 135 N.W.2d 799, 802 (1965); State
ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 265 Wis. 207, 213, 60 N.W.2d 763, 766 (1953).
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1. Is it desirable to increase or decrease the restrictions imposed on
the power of the state to regulate local government?
2. What degree of autonomy, however defined, should be granted to
local government?
3. To what extent should the local electorate have a choice as to the
form of local government?
4. Should all local governments be eligible for local autonomy?
5. To what extent should local governments be authorized to engage
in intergovernmental cooperation?
6. To what extent should local governments be authorized to
contract and otherwise associate with the private sector?
7. To what extent should local autonomy be limited, in dealing with
a particular subject, by the existence of state statutes relating to
the same subject?
8. What role should courts have in determining issues of local
autonomy? 126
IV. SISTER STATE MODELS OF STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS
A comparative volume can and has been written on this topic.
127
This section is limited to the discussion of state constitutional reforms
enacted since 1960.
A. Constitutional Minimalism
The 1969 Connecticut constitutional provision is notably laconic. It
makes clear that the legislature can delegate legislative authority to local
governments but leaves the scope of powers entirely to the discretion of
the state legislature.1
8
The 1972 Virginia Constitution also emphasizes legislative
supremacy by permitting special legislation by a two-thirds affirmative
vote of the legislature. 129 The constitution also includes a provision
defining the terms county, city, town, regional government, general law,
126. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 7, at
15.
127. See generally KRANE, RIGOS & HILL, JR., supra note 63.
128. CONN. CONST. art. X, § 1.
129. VA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 2.
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and special act3° that, if emulated in Wisconsin, could tidy up some
loose ends in the Badger State constitution.
B. Wisconsin Plus
It is hard to say that the Wisconsin home rule formula is obsolete
when Kansas, Iowa, and Wyoming have adopted its "local affairs and
government" phraseology since 1960.
The 1960 Kansas Constitution adds an express grant of the power to
levy "taxes, excises, fees, charges and other exaction."' 13' The 1968
provision of the Iowa Constitution also uses the "local affairs and
government" formula "2 but inserts a cleaner preemption rule,'33 a
disavowal of strict construction of grants of municipal power,' and a
clear statement that the legislature alone can authorize taxes.'35 A 1972
Wyoming provision also adopts the "local affairs and government"
formula expressly excepting statutes uniformly applicable to all cities
and towns and statutes prescribing debt limits. 36 Again, the legislature
expressly retains authority over the levying of taxes, excises, fees or any
other charges.'37 And Wyoming adds a rule that grants of home rule
power and authority "shall be liberally construed for the purpose of
giving the largest measure of self-government to cities and towns."'138
C. The Devolution of Powers Model
The 1968 Pennsylvania home rule provision typifies the devolution
of powers model: "A municipality which has a home rule charter may
exercise any power or perform any function not denied by this
Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at
any time.,' 39
This language aims at minimizing judicial interference by using the
indefinite article "any" rather than "local," "municipal," or "state
wide"-terms that invite lawyerly ingenuity in interpretation. The "not
130. Id. art. VII, § 1.
131. KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 5(b).
132. IOWA CONST. art. III, § 38A.
133. Home rule power and authority must not be "inconsistent with the laws of the
general assembly." Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. WYO. CONST. art. 13, § 1(b).
137. Id.
138. Id. art. 13, § 1(d).
139. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
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denied by" language lays down a preemption rule framed by state
constitution makers, not by judges. The Pennsylvania Constitution also
contains a definition section that inclusively defines "municipality" to
mean a county, city, or any similar general purpose unit of government
thus making each of these entities eligible for home rule status.
4°
In addition, the Pennsylvania local government article addresses a
vexed issue in Wisconsin-an action-forcing provision requiring the
legislature to establish uniform "procedure[s] for consolidation, merger,
or change of the boundaries of municipalities."'
4
Other provisions that may be of interest in Wisconsin include a
concise and flexible statement of the public purpose limitation as it
applies to local government expenditures, 4 1 as well as a carefully crafted
local government debt limit linked to total revenue.141
D. The Illinois Model'"
Article VII of the Illinois Constitution illustrates the complex kind
of decision rules that must be supplied if the goal of entrenching the
rights of local governments and local citizens is to be realized. These
decision rules include:
1. the definition of entities eligible for home rule status;
2. the scope of powers afforded these home rule entities;
3. the interpretation of powers granted to them;
4. the basis for dealing with interlocal conflict and collaboration;
and
5. the extent of state legislative control over the scope of home rule
powers.
Woven throughout the fabric of the article are requirements for local
citizen choice.
The complexity of these rules reflects the difficulty of coming to
terms with the multifaceted roles that local governments play in the
division of governmental responsibilities in a modern society. Counties,
cities, villages, and incorporated towns in Illinois are eligible for home
140. Id. art. IX, § 14.
141. Id. art. IX, § 8.
142. Id. art. IX, § 9.
143. Id. art. IX, § 10.
144. This section is drawn from Libonati, supra note 7, at 132-33.
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rule status. A self-executing grant of home rule powers to certain
counties and to municipalities with a population of more than 25,000 is
subject to repeal by referendum. Otherwise, home rule status can be
acquired only by referendum.'4 5
In contrast to devolution-of-powers constitutions, the Illinois article
distinguishes between several kinds of local autonomy: form of
government and office holding, functional, and fiscal matters. A home
rule unit can adopt, alter, or repeal its currently prescribed form of
government subject to referendum approval. Home rule municipalities
and home rule counties possess diverse powers with respect to the
creation, manner of selection, and terms of office of local officials."'
Under this article, "a home rule unit may exercise any power and
perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs." 147 What
is pertinent to its government and affairs is defined expressly to include
a copious grant of the police power "to regulate for the protection of the
public health, safety, morals and welfare" and "to license.' ' 18 This grant
of power expressly includes the power to tax and to incur debt,
attributes of fiscal autonomy without which home rule would be
straitjacketed in practice. 149
The Illinois Constitution also addresses and resolves the problem
created by Dillon's Rule. ° How are decision makers to read the
empowering text? The blunt answer is that "[p]owers and functions of
home rule units shall be construed liberally.''. "Counties and
municipalities which are not home rule units shall have only powers
granted to them by law" plus expressly granted constitutional powers
over form of government and office-holding, fiscal matters, and
providing for local improvements and services.' 2 Limited purpose units
of local government, such as townships, school districts, and special
districts, "shall have only powers granted by law."'53 In addition, the
article prescribes rules for resolving conflicts between legislative
145. See ILL. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4(a), 6(a)-(b).
146. See id. art. VII, § 6(a), (f).
147. Id. art. VII, § 6(a).
148. Id.
149. Id. See generally Rubin G. Cohn, Municipal Revenue Powers in the Context of
Constitutional Home Rule, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 27 (1957).
150. Dillon's Rule "holds that the political subdivisions of a state owe their existence to
grants of power from the state." U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, supra note 7, at 1.
151. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(m).
152. Id. art. VII, § 7.
153. Id. art. VII, § 8.
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enactments of home rule cities and home rule counties.1 4  It also is
sprinkled with provisions aimed at facilitating interlocal cooperation by
contract and power sharing."'
Finally, the article speaks to the neglected but pervasive question of
state preemption of home rule powers. The Illinois home rule provision
makes crystal clear that "[h]ome rule units may exercise and perform
concurrently with the State any power or function of a home rule unit to
the extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit
the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be
exclusive."'' 6 There is no room for a doctrine of implied preemption in
this language.
The express preemption question is dealt with generally as follows:
"The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the
exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule
unit ... .""' When the state chooses to assert a monopoly, a three-fifths
supermajority is required to deny or limit a home rule entity's fiscal and
other powers.58 Significantly, only two areas of home rule autonomy
are protected against legislative limitation or denial: the power to add to
the stock of local capital improvements by special assessment and the
power to finance the provision of special services."'
The Illinois model offers a benchmark to twenty-first century
framers for systematic disciplined debate and deliberation of the policy
issues that confront them.
E. State Mandates
The most noteworthy constitutional reform in state-local relations in
the past thirty years deals with the subject of unfunded state
mandates."W Wisconsin courts accept that state funding of existing and
enhanced programs is a matter of legislative grace. 6' At least eleven
state constitutions now accept the need for modifying the principle of
state legislative supremacy in view of its impact on local government
154. Id. art. VII, § 6(c).
155. Id. art. VII, § 10.
156. Id. art. VII, § 6(i).
157. Id. art. VII, § 6(h).
15& Id. art. VII, § 6(g).
159. Id. art. VII, § 6(1).
160. See Robert M. Shaffer, Comment, Unfunded State Mandates and Local
Governments, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1057, 1068-74 (1996).
161. In re D.E.R., 155 Wis. 2d 240, 254, 455 N.W.2d 239, 245 (1990).
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budgetary and taxing policy. 62 Twenty-first century constitution-makers
are well advised to confront this policy issue in their deliberations. 61
V. CONCLUSION
The following non-exclusive checklist is offered as a guide to
potential reform of the constitutional structure of state-local relations in
Wisconsin. However, it must be borne in mind that any project of
reform ought to be preceded by and draw upon a careful multi-
disciplinary study of local government in action. 61  Otherwise the
project of determining the fate of government from the bottom-up runs
the risk of being viewed from the top-down.
1. A Single Article
To reduce complexity and to clear the way for a thorough debate
about the soundness of existing distinctions between and among county,
city, village, town, school district, and special purpose governments,
there should be a single local government article.
2. Rethinking the Role of the State Legislature
The current Wisconsin Constitution contains a variety of provisions
aimed at narrowing the choices available to the legislature, including the
following: restricting local or special laws, prescribing both uniformity in
town and school district government and uniformity in taxation, and
limiting the scope of powers that may be granted to county
governments. In addition to text-based constraints, the legislature must
reckon with judge-made public purpose, public trust, and non-
delegation doctrines. The transaction costs imposed by varied and
variable rules on the pulling and hauling inherent in legislation
addressing state-local relations have not been investigated. Possible
transaction costs span: (1) "search and information costs" to discover
162. CAL. CONST. art. XIII B, § 6; COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(9); FLA. CONST. art. VII, §
18; HAW. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; LA. CONST. art. VI, § 14; MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 29; Mo.
CONST. art. X, § 21; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 28-a; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, para. 5; N.M.
CONST. art. X, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 24.
163. Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 267-
68 (2004).
164. An important study worthy of emulation in this regard is DAVID J. BARRON,
GERALD E. FRUG & RICK T. Su, DISPELLING THE MYTH OF HOME RULE (2004).
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the extent to which the legislature is permitted to make policy
concerning local government structure, function, fiscal, and personnel
matters; (2) "bargaining and decision costs" in enacting legislation
pertinent to local government; and (3) "policing and enforcements
costs" associated with implementing that legislation through judicial or
administrative implementation. 65
State framers must then weigh whether the benefits flowing from
constitutional constraints are fit for twenty-first century purposes. And,
then, they must take up the job of deciding whether the benefits flowing
from entrenching rules drawn from the current constitution as
interpreted outweigh the costs.
3. Rethink Entrenching the State/Local Dichotomy in the
Constitution
Strong judicial deference to the legislature yields no practical
immunity even to home rule units."6  And the home rule statute is
liberally interpreted to give a lot of functional policy-making initiative
even to towns. 167
4. Rethink Entrenching Uniformity Principles in the Constitution
Local government is about diversity and experimentation.
Constitutional constraints that invalidate local option legislation merit
skepticism." Consider letting contending proponents of centralization
versus decentralization slug it out issue by issue in the legislature.' 69
5. Recognize the Collaborative Dimension of Intergovernmental
Relations
165. Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979); see
also R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 6 (1988).
166. See LEAGUE OF WIS. MUNICIPALITIES, HANDBOOK FOR WISCONSIN MUNICIPAL
OFFICIALS 12-14 (2002); STARK, supra note 45, at 197.
167. See, e.g., Town of Beloit v. County of Rock, 2003 WI 8, [ 24, 30, 259 Wis. 2d 37,
24, 30, 657 N.W.2d 344, 24, 30.
168. See, e.g., Thompson v. Kenosha County, 64 Wis. 2d 673, 681-88, 221 N.W.2d 845,
850-53 (1974).
169. See generally Peter F. Nardulli, Geo-Political Cleavages, Conflict, and the American
States, in DIVERSITY, CONFLICT, AND STATE POLITICS 3-27 (Peter F. Nardulli ed., 1989);
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 684 (2001).
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The constitutional design of the current document skews toward
conflicts resolvable only through litigation. The 1971 amendments to
the Missouri Constitution point in another direction. The Missouri
Constitution now contains provisions relating to dissolution and
annexation, consolidation and separation, joint participation in common
undertakings, and interlocal cooperation. 7 ° The Pennsylvania
Constitution makes room for regional government. 171
Wisconsin's preemption doctrine is also a significant barrier to
power sharing between state and local government, particularly in the
sphere of regulatory policy-making. 72  Twenty-first century framers
should squarely address the preemption issue rather than leaving it to
the judiciary. 173
6. Clarify Fiscal Policy
The current constitution, as interpreted, sounds an uncertain
trumpet. On the one hand, local governments are immune from forced
redistribution of own-source tax revenue. On the other hand, they are
subject to unlimited unfunded state mandates.
Furthermore, the home rule provision confers zero taxing initiative.
Home rule entities are utterly dependent on an express legislative grant
of taxing power. Statutory levy limits are also in place. And the
proposed Taxpayer Protection Constitutional Amendment would create
a comprehensive revenue limit applicable to both the state and to every
type of local government unit. 114
Local government borrowing capacity is tied to a percentage of
taxable property-a measure that does not reflect the revenue stream
flowing from non-property tax revenue. The Taxpayer Protection
Amendment, if adopted, would subject taxes and most other revenues
pledged for debt service to revenue limits.7 5
Wisconsin constitution-makers operating within the framework of a
convention are in a better position to assess future trade-offs required
170. Mo. CONST. art. VI, §§ 5, 14, 16, 30(a).
171. PA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 6-7.
172. LEAGUE OF WIS. MUNICIPALITIES, supra note 166, at 16-18.
173. Briffault, supra note 163, at 263-64.
174. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 63, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005) (failing to pass the Senate,
May 4, 2006); Assemb. J. Res. 77, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005) (expiring at adjournment).
175. See MILWAUKEE COUNTY, WIS., PRELIMINARY OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED
MARCH 1, 2006,37-38 (relating to debt issuance and general corporate purpose bonds).
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for fiscal policy-making than proponents of piecemeal constitutional
reform.
* * *
